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ABSTRACT
This paper utilizes the Box-Cox transformation of variables
technique to empirically derive an industry wage equation. Section
I presents the determinants of potential wage differentials
between and within industries. Section II estimates a Box-Cox
industry wage equation. Likelihood ratio tests on alternative
specifications of this equation affirm that competitive structure
is a significant determinant of the industry wage rate and that
human capital specifications of the industry wage equation (for
the manufacturing sector) are not statistically valid. Section III
summarizes the results.
I.
 
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of theoretical and empirical
literature which suggests that the inter- and intraindustry
distribution of wages is determined by individual productive
characteristics, job desirability, as well as the competitive
structure of cost minimizing firms. Analysts from Marx (1906) to
2Becker (1975) agree that skill differentials will lead to
differentials in labor market compensation. Smith’s (1976) theory
of compensating differentials -- differences in remuneration
associated with occupational risks, pleasantness of work, and so 
forth -- is, also, a popular notion among orthodox labor
economics; however, Brown (1980) casts doubt on the empirical
validity of compensating differentials.
This paper empirically derives an industry wage equation,
which includes a set of covariates that have been hypothesized as
indicators of the presence of noncompensating wage differentials.
By noncompensating wage differentials, I mean the fraction of the
wage payment that is disassociated with both individual productive
attributes and job desirability. Theoretical and empirical work 
on these types of differentials -- sometimes referred to as labor
rents (Katz and Summers, 1989) -- is of a more recent vintage and
considerably more  controversial with respect to their existence
and the policy  implications that flow from their existence. The
phrase "wage differentials" in this paper shall refer exclusively
to noncompensating wage differentials.
     Botwinick (1993) provides a theoretical treatment of inter-
and intraindustry wage differentials from a Marxian perspective.
He argues that the differential competitive structure of firms,
that is differences in variables such as capital intensity,
establishment size, profitability, location of firms using the
best reproducible conditions of production (regulating firms),
3size of  fixed capital investment, and so forth, between and
within industries establishes "limits" to the size of wage
increases. These limits (sources of downward pressure on wage
rates) establish upper bounds on industry and firm wage rates and
the height of these limits varies between and within industries.
The nature and extent of worker organization is an important
element in determining actual wage differentials because such
organization strengthens the collective power of workers to push
wages towards the competitive limits.
     Botwinick is not alone in attempting to explain or measure 
the extent of wage differentials. Groshen (1988) compares theories
of intraindustry wage differentials. Dickens and Katz (1987)
explores the issue of wage differentials from the perspective of
efficiency wage theory, while Williams (1987) examines the
intersection of discrimination and differential wages from a
Marxian perspective. Finally, Howell (1989) presents a
"structural" theory of wage differentials.    
     Although the theoretical details of these models differ
considerably, each approach suggests that the competitive process
is compatible with  multiple inter- and intraindustry wage, price,
and profit configurations. Second, there is substantial agreement
that wage  differentials are positively correlated with such
variables as capital intensity, establishment size, and, of
course, the extent  of unionization. Botwinick also argues that
wage payments should be positively correlated with the
4differential profitability of industries and firms.
This paper does not attempt to statistically differentiate
among the competing explanations of wage differentials. Rather, I
empirically derive the wage equation. Empirical derivation is
necessitated by the absence of a clear theoretical guide to the
functional form of the wage equation when competitive structure
variables are present. Given the empirically derived
specification, I then test for the statistical significance of the
structure variables as well as alternative specifications of the
wage equation.
II. THE MODEL AND ITS HYPOTHESES
     The Mincer human capital equation is the unrivaled
specification of the wage equation in empirical studies of the
labor market. This equation posits that the natural log of
earnings is a function of education, experience and its square,
and "other variables" (Blinder, 1976). Econometrically:
Ln W = &0 + &1*Ed + &2*Exp + &3*Exp
2
 + &4*Z1 + &5*Z2 + , where W  is
alternatively used to represent earnings or the wage rate;  is a
residual which follows the usual Gauss-Markov assumptions; &3 is
negative; Z1 is a vector which may include such individual
characteristics as health, marital status, and hours worked; Z2 is
a vector which may include such (neoclassical) competitive
"imperfections" and compensating differentials as unionization,
industry concentration, and commuting time to work. The only
5popular alternative to the log-linear functional form is the
linear functional form. However, there is no compelling
theoretical reason to accept the supremacy of the log-linear or
linear functional forms.
Blinder has argued that the functional form of the earnings
equation ought to be made on empirical grounds. Yet, there are
only a handful of studies that have followed Blinder’s suggestion
(Heckman and Polachek, 1974; Hodson, 1985; White and Olson,
1981).1
     This study, like its predecessors, utilizes the Box-Cox
transformation of variables technique to derive the wage
(earnings) equation (Spitzer, 1982, and 1978; Blackley, et al.,
1983; Seaks and Layson, 1982;  Lahiri and Egy, 1981). The Box-Cox
specification is a flexible functional form.2 For each independent
and dependent variable X, X( ) represents a power transformation
of X, such that X( ) = (X  - 1)/ . L’Hospital’s rule implies that
lim
 --> 0 X( )=Ln X. Also, X( =1) = X - 1. One does not have to
assume an inherently linear model a priori, rather statistical
tests can be employed to see if  = 0 or  = 1 are appropriate 
restrictions. If there is theoretical dissension regarding the
propriety of a subset of X as explanatory variables then the
appropriate statistical tests of an empirically derived model will
help shed some light on this debate. Consider the following
model.
(1) Y( 0) = 0 + 1X1( 1) + 2X2( 2) + 3X3( 3) + .
6An unrestricted version of this model yields estimates of 0, 1,
2, 3, 0, 1, 2, 3, where the ’s are power transformations and
the ’s are slope coefficients.
If the null hypothesis is 2 = 3 = 0, then a separate
estimation of (2)allows one to use a likelihood ratio test to
examine the null hypothesis.
(2) Y( 0) = 0 + 1X1( 1) + 
Although one may be able to reject the null hypothesis 2 = 3
= 0 when there are no restrictions on the ’s, one may want to
examine the robustness of this conclusion under alternative
specifications, e.g., when the equation is log-linear as is the
standard human capital equation.
Again, this is a simple procedure. A likelihood ratio test of
equations (1) and (3) allows one to test the null hypothesis of a
log-linear functional form. Similarly, a likelihood ratio test of
equations (1) and (4) allows one to test the joint null hypotheses
that the correct specification is log-linear and that 2 = 3 = 0.
(3) Y( 0=0) = 0 + 1X1( 1=1) + 2X2( 2=1) + 3X3( 3=1) + 
(4) Y( 0=0) = 0 + 1X1( 1=1) + 
The analytical core of the model to be estimated is:
(5) F(W) = f(Y, D, C).
The industry wage3 (W) is determined by three sets of variables: 
labor quality (Y), job desirability and the current state of the 
demand for laborers (D), and the industry’s competitive structure
7(C).
      As discussed, the specification of the wage equation cannot
be determined solely on the basis of economic theory. Theory,
however, does place general restrictions on the specification of
(5). Theoretical consistency requires that the wage rate is
nondecreasing with respect to increases in the competitive limits
to wage payments, the quality of labor power, the unpleasantness
of work, and increases in the demand for labor.4
     The hypothesized equation is:     
Indwage( 0) = &0 + &1*Educate( 1) + &2*Indexp( 2) + &3*Tenure( 3)
            + &4*Percfem( 4) + &5*Overtime( 5) + &6*Layoffs( 6)
            + &7*Hours( 7) + &8*Quits( 8) + &9*Injcases( 9)
            + &10*Rokdif( 10) + &11*Koverl( 11) + &12*Uncov( 12)
            + &13*Estsize( 13) + &14*Tensize( 14) + &15*CR4( 15)
            + &16*Percprod( 16) + 
   Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the industry wage
rate and accompanying explanatory variables. The variables are:
Indwage = industry wage rate; 
Educate = the level of education for the industry’s workforce;
Indexp= years of work experience, computed as age-schooling-6;
Tenure = number of years at current job;
Percfem = fraction of workforce that is female;
Overtime = hours of overtime per week;
Hours = length of workweek;
8Layoffs = number of layoffs per 100 workers per month/100;
Quits = number of quits per 100 workers per month/100;
Injcases = lost workday cases per 100 fulltime employees/100;
Indrok = return on capital; 
Rokdif = Indrok - .07 (mean value of Indrok)
Koverl = $1,000’s of capital per worker;
Uncov = fraction of workforce covered by unions;
Estsize = number of workers per establishment;
Percprod = fraction of production (nonsupervisory) workers;
Cr4 = four-firm concentration ratio;  
Tensize = Tenure*Estsize.
     The data for this study is taken from the Dickens-Katz 
Industry Level Data Set Circa 1983.5 I note here, however, two
problems in the data set: (1) missing observations because
industry level data were combined from a  number of different
governmental sources; and (2) some degree of  collinearity between
variables due to the level of aggregation;  the data were
collected at the level of three digit Census  Industrial
Classification Codes.
     The sample is limited to manufacturing data. Data on such 
variables as capital intensity are much easier to obtain for 
manufacturing and are much more meaningful with respect to 
understanding the competitive structure of firms. Missing 
observations have been deleted.
      The power transformations ( 1, 2, ... , 16) imply that the
9wage equation is inherently nonlinear in its coefficients.
Analytical solutions for this type of equation are sometimes
impossible to obtain (Greene, 1990:239-276, 363-377). Accordingly,
standard econometric software packages generally rely on an
iterative search procedure to maximize the likelihood function L =
L(&, , 2).6
     However, estimation does not require complete agnosticism 
regarding the model’s parameters. In particular, there is a priori
information which suggests the imposition of linearity
restrictions on the transformation coefficients of Indexp,
Overtime, and Rokdif.
     The linearity restrictions on Overtime and Indexp are
justified by appealing to institutional considerations and the 
characteristics of the data set. There simply is not a great deal
 of variation in Indexp (the coefficient of variation is less than
 10%); since Indexp = age - schooling - 6, the minimum and maximum
 values would indicate an average age spread of 32 to 41 years. A
 linearity restriction on experience for this sample of workers is
 a reasonable approximation given the limited variation in the
data and the average ages of the workers. On the other hand, 
fixed rate overtime premiums, for example time-and-one-half pay
per hour of overtime, are a widely accepted practice in the
American labor market; hence, each additional hour of overtime
yields a constant increase in pay.
     The differential profitability variable (Rokdif) contains 
10
negative values. Therefore, it must enter the Box-Cox
specification  with a linearity constraint.
     Finally, separate power transformations for each group of
variables and the dependent variable were obtained:7 0 for the
dependent variable; Y for Educate,  Tenure, and Percfem; D for
Layoffs, Hours, Quits, Injcases; and  C for Koverl, Uncov,
Tensize, Percprod, and Cr4.
The foregoing simplifying restrictions and a priori
information implies that the estimated equation will have the
form:
Indwage( 0) = &0 + &1*Educate( Y) + &2*Indexp   + &3*Tenure( Y)
            + &4*Percfem( Y)   + &5*Overtime     + &6*Layoffs( D)
            + &7*Hours( D)     + &8*Quits( D)    + &9*Injcases( D)
            + &10*Rokdif       + &11*Koverl( C)  + &12*Uncov( C)
            + &13*Estsize( C)  + &14*Tensize( C) + &15*CR4( C)
            + &16*Percprod( C) + 
     Educate, Indexp, Tenure, Percfem are the empirical proxies 
for labor quality. However, Percfem may be as much an indicator 
of the prevalence of wage discrimination and involuntary parttime
labor as an alledged indicator of (lower) labor quality (Ehrenberg
and Smith, 1985:539-544; Gunderson, 1989).
     To the extent that actual job attainment is solely a 
function of utility maximization then the human capital approach
is correct to argue that Overtime, Layoffs, Hours,8 Quits, and
11
Injcases are indicators of job desirability. These variables may
also be proxies for the state of the industry’s demand for labor.
For example, tight labor markets tend to be characterized by large
amounts of overtime, fewer layoffs, and long workweeks; Katz and
Summers (1989) make the persuasive argument that the quit rate
should have a negative correlation with the industry wage rate
since workers are less likely to abandon jobs with large wage
differentials, that is, Quits is a proxy for the size of the labor
queue, which tends to be greater for high wage jobs. However,
these variables and their interpretation are  not the primary
focus of this paper and whether one views them  as empirical
proxies for the current state of the demand for  labor across
industries or job desirability, there is a  theoretical
justification for their inclusion in the wage  equation.
      Establishment size (Estsize), percent unionized (Uncov),
capital intensity (Koverl), and percent production workers
(Percprod) are empirical  proxies for the industry’s competitive
structure. The model implies that the industry wage rate should
have a positive correlation with all of these variables, except
Percprod.
     Finally, differential profitability (Rokdif) is also a 
measure of competitive structure and Botwinick’s analysis
indicates that this variable should have a positive correlation
with the industry  wage rate. If, however, workers are able to
capture all of the  differential rent associated with above
12
average productiveness then the coefficient on this variable may
be equal to zero. An appropriate null hypothesis is that this
variable has a nonnegative slope coefficient. 
     Segmentation analysis (Edwards, 1979) suggests that under a
bureaucratic labor process job tenure is likely to have a greater
 (positive) impact on wage rates in large establishments than in 
smaller ones. This theoretical information should be included in 
the wage equation prior to estimation. Empirically, the model may
 be improved with the job tenure-establishment size interaction
variable, Tensize = Tenure*Estsize (Pearce, 1990). The operative
assumptions regarding Tenure and Estsize are W/ (Tenure) > 0,
W/ (Estsize) > 0, 2W/ (Tenure)2 < 0, 2W/ (Tenure) (Estsize) < 0,
and 2W/ (Estsize)2 < 0.        
     The primary null hypotheses are that the slope coefficients
on the competitive structure variables are jointly and
individually equal to zero, i.e., ß10=ß11=ß13=ß14=ß15=ß16=0. If these
hypotheses cannot be rejected then the statistical results support
the human capital claim that jobs are allocated on the basis of
individual productive capacity and individual preferences for the
various characteristics of employment. Rejection of these
hypotheses implies that the statistical model is consistent with
the notion that both individual and job attributes are
determinants of the distribution of wages.
The inclusion of product market concentration (CR4) in the 
wage equation allows for a test of the market power hypothesis.9
13
Neoclassicals and segmentation theorists use product market
concentration as a measure of imperfect competition. In Marxian
economics, product market concentration is not a causal variable
in the factor or goods market pricing process (Semmler, 1984). The
null hypothesis is that the industry concentration ratio is a
statistically insignificant determinant of the industry wage rate,
i.e., ß15=0.
If the industry wage equation is linear or log-log then the
appropriate null hypotheses are 0= Y= D= C=1 or 0= Y= D= C=0,
respectively. A log-linear specification is consistent with null
hypothesis is 0=0 and Y= D= C=1. Continuing, the standard human
capital specification implies 0=0 and ß10=ß11=ß13=ß14=ß15=ß16=0. 
Whether the dependent variable should enter the wage equation
with a logarithmic or a linear restraint requires evaluating the
separate null hypotheses 0=0 and 0=1, respectively.
Finally, testing the joint hypotheses ß5=ß6=ß7=ß8=ß9=0
determines whether or not the job desirability and current state
of demand for laborers variables are collectively significant.
Collectively, this series of statistical tests allows one to
examine the robustness of the statistical results under
alternative functional forms. They also allow one to examine the
validity of the orthodox wage equation.
2. The Industry Wage Equation
The estimated equation is reported in Table 2. The results
are unsurprising with respect to Educate, Indexp, Tenure, Percfem,
14
Overtime, Injcases, Koverl, Estsize, Tensize, and Uncov. These
variables are  statistically significant and have the expected
signs. The Hours and Layoffs coefficients are significant and
negative. The negative coefficient on the Hours variable is not
particularly troubling; the average length of the workweek is
included here as a normalizing variable. On the other hand, under
orthodox analysis, the coefficient on Layoffs should be positive;
workers are compensated for the greater risk of  unemployment by
receiving a higher wage rate (Topel and Murphy,  1987).
     The negative coefficient on Layoffs would tend to be in line
with the Botwinick approach to wage determination. A high layoff 
rate reduces the organizational capacity of workers and hence
restricts their ability to extract a  favorable wage from capital.
The negative coefficient on Quits affirms the Katz-Summers
contention that this variable is a proxy variable for the size of
labor queues.
     The remaining variables are statistically insignificant. This
is not troubling with respect to the coefficient on CR4 since the
Marxian approach argues that industry concentration (as a measure
of monopoly power) is not a significant explanatory variable of
inter- and intraindustry wage differences. Neoclassical and
segmentation theory argues that this variable should have a
positive and significant coefficient. Also, the coefficient on
Rokdif is not statistically significant.    
Interpretation of the model’s parameters is not
15
straightforward. In order to the compare the efficacy of the 
current specification of the wage equation with alternative 
specifications, I have used the estimated value of the model’s 
parameters and the mean value of the independent and dependent 
variables to calculate the percentage change in the wage rate 
associated with a one unit interindustry difference, ceteris 
paribus, in an explanatory variable. These descriptive "rates of 
return" are presented in Table 3.
     Column 2 of Table 3 presents the results for the current 
specification of the wage equation, which I have labeled the 
"unrestricted" wage equation. Columns 3 - 10 presents the results
 of several restrictions on the wage equation.10 Indexp, Overtime,
 and Rokdif continue to have linear power transformations in all 
regressions. The "restricted" specification contains the
restriction 0 = Y = D = C = -.44, where -.44 was determined by
maximizing the likelihood function. Columns 4 and 5, the log
dependent variable and linear dependent variable specifications,
respectively, were estimated with the restriction that 0 = 0 and
0 = 1, respectively, while  all other power restrictions are
identical to the unrestricted  model. 
     Columns 6 - 8 are inherently linear specifications of the
wage equation. They represent completely linear, log-linear and
log-log regressions, respectively.
     Finally, columns 9 and 10 are alternative specifications of
human capital type wage regressions. Both  regressions assume the
16
slope coefficients on the competitive  structure variables, except
union coverage, are equal to zero.  Column 9 has the additional
restriction that 0 = 0  while the  other power transformations
have their unrestricted values, i.e., Y = -.27, D = -2.89. Column
10 is the ubiquitous Mincer earnings equation and, as such, it
provides a useful comparative specification. 
     The magnitude and direction of the "rates of return"
associated with the unrestricted Box-Cox regression (column 2)
compare quite favorably with the other specifications. For
example, both the Mincer and unrestricted Box-Cox specification
imply a 20% "return to education" in the manufacturing sector. The
statistical significance and qualitative impact of each variable
is quite stable across alternative specifications.
     Table 4 presents the results of several hypothesis tests on
the specification of the wage equation. Column 1 provides a brief
description of the nature of the test while column two lists the
null hypotheses. The critical value of the X2 statistic at the 5%
significance level, where the degrees of freedom equal the number
of restrictions (Greene, 1990: 354), is provided in column 3.
Using the value of the log likelihood (Log L) function of the
estimated equation (reported in column 4) and the log likelihood
value from the unrestricted equation (-24.8887), the likelihood
ratio (LR) test statistic is reported in column 5. The null
hypothesis is rejected if LR exceeds the critical value of the X2
statistic. The decision to accept or reject the null hypotheses is
17
reported in  column 6.
The first row is a test of the hypothesis that the
coefficients on the competitive structure variables (excluding the
 coefficient on Uncov) are jointly equal to zero. It is strongly 
rejected. Competitive structure cannot be ignored as a determinant
of the industry wage rate. Similarly, the second row is a test of
the hypothesis that the job desirability and state of demand
variables are jointly equal to zero. Again, the hypothesis is
strongly rejected.
Rows 3 and 4 test whether logarithmic and linear
transformations, respectively, of the dependent variable are 
acceptable. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in either case,
indicating that inherently linear power transformations on the
industry wage rate are statistically acceptable.
     Rows 5 - 7 provide test on the hypotheses that the correct 
functional form is log-linear, linear, and log-log, respectively.
 All null hypotheses are strongly rejected. This result, combined
 with the earlier hypothesis tests on the dependent variable, 
implies that although inherently linear transformations of the 
dependent variable may be permissible, inherently linear 
transformations of the independent variables are not permissible.
     The last row in Table 4 is a test of the null hypothesis that
the  human capital style equation is an appropriate 
representation of the wage equation. The null hypothesis is 
strongly rejected. Logarithmic regressions of the industry wage 
18
on labor quality and job desirability variables represent an
inappropriate specification of the industry wage equation. 
     Informal model selection techniques (Kmenta, 1986: 599-600) 
list theoretical consistency, parameter constancy, parsimonious 
parametrization and interpretable parameters of interest, and 
encompassing (the ability to explain the characteristics of rival
 models) among the important elements of model selection. These 
criteria support the convincing results of the likelihood ratio 
tests and affirm the specification of a nonlinear wage equation 
which includes competitive structure variables as an appropriate 
statistical description of the economic process involved in the 
determination of interindustry wage rates; persistent
interindustry wage differentials may be established for reasons
disassociated with variations in labor quality and job
desirability.11,12
     The general structure of the Box-Cox regression model and the
statistically significant coefficient on Tensize indicates that
competitive structure and labor quality may interact in a rather
complex manner to determine wage rates. Consider the simple
Box-Cox model: Y( 0) = &0 + &1*X1( 1) + &2*X2( 2) + e. Taking the
expected value of both sides, rearranging terms and
differentiating, (dY/Y)/dXi = g(&0, 1, &2, 0, 1, 2, X1, X2). Human
capital style wage equations obliterate the interdependence  of
regression covariates in the determination of wage rates, whereas
19
a specification consistent with Marxian analysis implicitly and
explicitly acknowledges this interconnection. But, if it is
conceptually and empirically incorrect to enforce additive
separability on the specification of the wage equation, then one
simply cannot meaningfully derive the aggregate distribution of
labor income from the incorrectly specified microeconomic wage
equations of the human capital sort. The theoretical mapping from
the distribution of productive characteristics to the distribution
of labor income must account for noncompensating wage
differentials.
III. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
     The collective implication of the statistical results are:
(1) the labor earnings process is inherently nonlinear; (2) there
is a complex relationship between competitive structure and the
interindustry distribution of wages; (3) competitive structure and
labor quality may interact to determine industry wage rates; and,
by extension, (4) individual remuneration for labor services
depends on individual labor quality, (possibly) job preferences,
and the competitive structure of firms where the individual is 
employed; hence, the wage-productivity connection is somewhat
"loose."
These preliminary results provide support for the notion that
individual compensation is not solely a function of individual
productive attributes, at least within the manufacturing sector.
Moreover, they also suggest that our understanding of the earnings
20
process would be improved if we incorporate structural variables,
e.g., capital intensity, into the estimated wage equation.
NOTES
1.These studies provide tentative affirmation of the Mincer
earnings equation. Hodson’s theoretical analysis is in the spirit
of the current model.
2.The Box-Cox specification is "flexible" relative to the standard
(inherently linear) specification of the wage equation. It is
however considerably less flexible than a fully nonparametric
specification, see Ullah (1988) and Hardle (1990).
3.The theoretical analysis is applicable at both the industry and
firm levels. However, the current data contains only industry
level variables.
4.For a more detailed theoretical analysis see Mason
(forthcoming).
5.This data was graciously provided by Lawrence F. Katz, Ph. D.,
Harvard and National Bureau of Economic Research. The original
sources of the raw data are listed with Table 1.
6.I utilize K. White’s SHAZAM (1990) to estimate the parameters of
this equation.
7.As a practical matter, these groupings help preserve degrees of
freedom (in an admittedly small sample).
8.With individual level data, the "hours" variable might be
associated with simultaneous equation bias. However, with industry
level data it is reasonable to accept the average level of the
workweek as institutionally determined. Individuals who wish to
work greater or lesser hours then seek employment in those
industries whose workweek is conformable to their preferences.
Using "hours" as an explanatory variable eliminates the
distinction between earnings and the wage rate.
9.The market power hypothesis is a summary phrase for the human
capital result that the wage rate will equal the value of the
marginal product of labor, unless monopoly or monopsony power
exists in the labor market.
10.The full set of regressions are available from the author upon
request.
11.Koverl and Estsize are not proxies for the value of fringe
benefits. Including the latter as an explanatory variable does not
alter the statistical results.
12.Zarembka (1974) indicates that the Box-Cox transformation is 
not robust with respect to heteroskedasticity. However, a series
of of diagnostic tests in our case revealed that the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity cannot be rejected at conventional
test levels. Various collinearity (Belsey, et al., 1980)checks
revealed that the Hours and Indexp variables are most certainly
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degraded by collinearity. This is perhaps the reason for the
insignificant coefficients on Hours and Indexp in Table 3.
                            TABLE 1    
                     DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS                      
 ==============================================================  
   VARIABLE   N    MEAN STD DEV   MINIMUM  MAXIMUM SOURCE
-------------------------------------------------------------    
   Educate   54 12.9320  0.7869   11.5870  15.0360  m
    Indexp    54 20.3770  1.8635   13.5390  23.3150  o
    Tenure    54  5.2611  1.2755    2.3000   9.8000  n
    Percfem   54  0.2900  0.1499    0.0779   0.8377  c (tab.B2,3)
    Overtime  54  2.5299  0.9662    0.9016   6.2129  c (tab.C2)
    Layoffs   54  1.6699  1.3793    0.1000   9.3000  i
    Hours     54 39.2840  1.7828   33.1000  44.1610  c (tab.C2)
    Quits     54  1.2949  0.6756    0.3000   3.2000  i
    Injcases  54  5.0114  2.2564    1.5000  11.4000  g
    Rokdif    54  0.0023  0.0277   -0.0512   0.0682
    Indrok    54  0.0723  0.0277    0.0188   0.1382  a
    Koverl    54 23.2090 16.4520    2.5153  71.8670  d
    Uncov     54  0.3107  0.1369    0.0558   0.6639  m
    Estsize   54 58.6930 34.2970   16.1790 186.3500  j
    Percprod  54  0.6961  0.1283    0.3792   0.8814  c (tab.B2)
    Cr4       54 35.4780 14.8260    7.0000  81.4000  f
    Indwage   54  8.48    1.7209    5.0193  13.36    c (tab.C2)
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    Sources
   a Three-year average. Source Book: Statistics of Income 1979, 
1980, 1981. Corporate Income Tax Returns, Treasury          
      Department.
   b Employment and Earnings, January 80, 83 & 85, table 11.
   c Employment and Earnings, March 83.
   d Plant and equipment in 1000s in 1972 dollars/employees. 
Input/Output Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1984.
   f By value of shipments. 1977 Census of Manufactures, table 8.
   g Lost workday cases per 100 fulltime employees/100. USBLS, 
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses 1982, Bulletin 2196; Apr
       84, table 1.
   i Per 100 empl. per mo./100. Employment and Earnings, March   
    82,table D2.
   j Enterprise Statistics, 1977, table 4. [Income data from     
      source (a)].
   m 1983 Current Population Survey.
   n USDOL, Job Tenure of Workers, Special Labor Force Report    
    172, 1975. Employment and Earnings, March 1974, table B3.
   o Age minus 6 minus (last year of school completed). Computed 
      from CPS.
------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Dickens and Katz, 1987:84-85.
==================================================================
TABLE 2
UNRESTRICTED BOX-COX WAGE EQUATION
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Indwage(.47) = 30045 + 14.04*Educate(-.27) + .0537*Indexp        
                [2.60]  [9.64]               [3.24]
              + 8.6892*Tenure(-.27) - .2589*Percfem(-.27)        
                 [3.315]              [-7.23]
              + .0634*Overtime - .0021*Layoffs(-2.89)            
                 [2.02]           [-3.96]
              - 86895*Hours(-2.89) - .0183*Quits(-2.89)          
                 [-2.60]            [-1.74]
              + 2.178*Injcases(-2.89) + .3324*Rokdif             
                 [1.70]                  [-.39]
              + .1124*Koverl(-.11) + .1979*Uncov(-.11)           
                 [1.76]               [4.31]
              + 8.3022*Estsize(-.11) + -9.8511*Tensize(-.11)     
                 [3.29]                [-3.24]
              - 1.04*Cr4(-.11) - .0173*Percprod(-.11)            
                 [-1.19]         [-1.57]
R2 = .9365  Adj R2 = .9090  N = 54  Log L = -24.8887
0 = .47 Y = -.27 D = -2.89 C = -.11
The t-statistics are in brackets.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
                    TABLE 3
        DESCRIPTIVE RATES OF RETURN
============================================
          UNRE-     RE-      LOG      LINEAR  
VARIABLE  STRICTED STRICTED  DEPEND   DEPEND  
--------------------------------------------
educate    19.92%   21.58%   20.57%   19.28% 
indexp      1.97%    1.71%    1.73%    2.22%   
tenure      2.09%    2.27%    2.02%    2.21% 
percfem   -45.66%  -36.48%  -45.24%  -46.31% 
overtime    2.32%    3.63%    1.74%*   2.92%   
layoffs    -0.01%   -1.58%   -0.01%   -0.01%  
hours      -2.00%   -3.75%   -1.55%   -2.48%  
quits      -0.25%   -2.90%*  -0.11%*  -0.41%  
injcases    0.15%    1.41%    0.16%    0.15%* 
rokdif    -12.17%*   4.17%*  -4.56%  -21.10%* 
koverl      0.13%    0.16%    0.14%    0.11%+ 
uncov      26.52%   26.42%   30.34%   22.57%  
estsize      .04%     .02%     .03%     .05%  
tensize
percprod   15.68%+  17.04%+  18.02%   13.16%+ 
cr4        -0.05%*  -0.03%*  -0.05%*  -0.06%* 
R2          0.95      .94     0.95     0.95     
Log L     -24.8887 -31.46   -25.3993 -25.4689   
0          0.47    -0.44     0        1.0
Y         -0.27    -0.44    -0.27    -0.27
D         -2.89    -0.44    -2.89    -2.89
C         -0.11    -0.44    -0.11    -0.11
=========================================================
                         TABLE 3 (CONT’D)
                   DESCRIPTIVE RATES OF RETURN
=================================================================
                    LOG-     LOG-    HUMAN     REGULAR
VARIABLE   LINEAR   LINEAR   LOG     CAPITAL   MINCER
------------------------------------------------------
educate    22.49%   23.67%   20.14%   17.49%   19.64%
indexp      2.60%    2.45%    1.51%    1.84%    3.05%+
expsqred     n.a.     n.a.     n.a.     n.a.        
tenure       .73%*   1.39%*    .71%*   1.37%    1.38%
percfem   -64.23%  -68.42%  -48.56%  -49.71%  -68.62%
overtime    6.02%    6.01%    4.58%    1.85%+   5.31%
layoffs    -1.68%   -1.25%+  -1.27%*  -0.01%   -0.89%*
hours      -6.27%   -6.13%   -4.99%   -0.86%*  -4.73%
quits       0.83%*   0.34%*  -5.70%   -0.29%   -0.61%*
injcases   -0.42%*  -0.00%*   0.96%+   0.06%*  -0.17%*
rokdif     26.79%*  38.77%*   7.09%*   n.a.     n.a.
koverl      0.09%*   0.07%*   0.17%    n.a.     n.a.
uncov      49.28%   45.56%   30.81%   32.27%   44.23%
estsize      .02%+    .05%*    .03%*   n.a.     n.a.
tensize                   *        *   n.a.     n.a.
percprod   27.17%   25.07%+  17.70%+   n.a.     n.a.
cr4         0.05%*   0.06%*  -0.02%*   n.a.     n.a.
------------------------------------------------------
R2           .91      .92      .93      .93     0.89
Log L     -40.78   -37.18   -34.5889 -34.4739 -44.6
0          1.0      0        0        0        0
Y          1.0      1.0      0       -0.27     1.0
D          1.0      1.0      0       -2.89     1.0
C          1.0      1.0      0        n.a.     n.a.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
* Variable is insignificant at either the 1%, 5%, or 10% level of
   significance.
+ Variable is significant only at 10% level of significance.
=================================================================
TABLE 4 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS OF FUNCTIONAL FORM
TEST NULL
HYPOTHESES
CRITICAL
X2(n)
LOG L LR STAT RESULT
Competitive  
 Structure
ß10=ß11=ß13=  
ß14=ß15=ß16=0 12.59 -34.42 19.07 Reject
Job
Desireability
ß5=ß6=ß7=
ß8=ß9=0 11.07 -49.50 49.22 Reject
Log Wage 0=0 3.84 -25.40 1.02
Cannot
Reject
Linear Wage 0=1 3.84 -25.47 1.16
Cannot
Reject
Log-Linear
0=0
Y= D= C=1 9.49 -37.18 24.58 Reject
Linear 0= Y= D= C=1 9.49 -40.78 31.78 Reject
Log-Log 0= Y= D= C=0 9.49 -34.59 19.40 Reject
Human Capital
0=0
ß10=ß11=ß13=
ß14=ß15=ß16=0 14.07 -34.44 19.10 Reject
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